FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION-TRADE OR BUSINESS-A
FULL-TIME GAMBLER WHO GAMBLES SOLELY FOR His OWN
BENEFIT IS ENGAGED IN A TRADE OR BUSINESS--Commissioner
v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987).

The application of many of the provisions of the federal income tax law has been based on whether the taxpayer's activities
fall within the definition of a trade or business.' The statutes,
however, fail to define the term "trade or business." '2 Consequently, that term had to be defined through the judicial process. 3 Historically, the courts have construed the term
"business" in a very broad sense to encompass all activities enI Under the Corporation Tax imposed by the Tariff Act of 1909, a taxpayer
corporation would not be subject to the corporate tax unless it was "carrying on or
doing business." Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6., § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17 (1909) (current version at I.R.C. § 11 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Since 1909, there has been a
dramatic increase in the statutory use of the term trade or business. See Boyle, What
is a Trade or Business?, 39 TAX LAw 737, 737 (1986). According to one commentator,
a 1986 LEXIS search of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) for the term "trade or
business" revealed that the term appears in over 25 subsections and in over 32
regulations. Id. at 737, 737 n.3.
The significance of whether a taxpayer's activities falls within the definition of a
trade or business may be shown by describing some of the various statutory contexts in which it is used. Under Code section 166 the taxpayer is required to show
that he is engaged in a trade or business before he may avail himself of the more
favorable tax treatment afforded to business bad debts. I.R.C.-§ 166(d)(2) (1982).
Generally, the deduction for net operating losses is limited to trade or business
expenses. See id. § 172(d)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The deduction for moving
expenses is permitted only if the move relates to a change in the location of the
taxpayer's trade or business. See id. § 217 (1982). A passive activity is defined
under Code section 469 as any activity "which involves the conduct of any trade or
business, and in which the taxpayer does not materially participate." I.R.C.
§ 469(c) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 469 limits the extent to which losses may be
deducted if the losses are generated by an individual or certain entities while engaged in a passive activity. See id. Under Code section 513, a tax is imposed on
charities if they earn income from an unrelated trade or business. See id. § 513(a)
(1982). Code section 1231 provides for favorable tax treatment for the gain or loss
on the disposition of assets used in a trade or business. See I.R.C. § 1231 (Supp. IV
1986). The self-employment tax is imposed on an individual's income earned in a
trade or business. See id. § 1402(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
2 The term "trade or business" has been specifically defined for certain limited
purposes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 355(b)(2) (1982), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10233, 101 Stat. 1330-411 (defines
"trade or business" in the context of stock distributions of a controlled corporation); I.R.C. § 502(b) (1982) (defines "trade or business" in the context of "feeder
organizations"); I.R.C. § 513 (1982) (current version at 1 I.R.C. § 513(d), (h)
(Supp. IV 1986)) (defines "trade or business" in the context of tax-exempt organizations); I.R.C. § 7701(a)(26) (1982) (defines "trade or business" to include the
position of public officer).
3 See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
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tered into for the purpose of earning a livelihood.4 As the term
evolved, it became apparent that this definition was too expansive and that the term "trade or business" should be more narrowly interpreted to exclude certain activities.- In an effort to
narrow this definition, two divergent standards have emerged.
One standard required a case-by-case analysis of all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the application of the term.6 The
other standard, the minority view, required that a taxpayer hold
himself out as offering goods and services before he could be
considered as engaging in a "trade or business." 7
Each standard has gained a degree of acceptance in the
lower courts, resulting in inconsistencies regarding the appropriate standard that should be applied." Recently, a split of authority has developed among the various circuit courts of appeals as
to which standard should be applied to a full-time gambler. 9 In
4 In 1910, the United States Supreme Court defined the term "business,"
adopting BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY definition as "[t]hat which occupies the time,
attention and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit." Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911) (citation omitted). This language continues to
be quoted by the courts when determining the trade or business status of the tax-

payer. 1 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs

20.1.2

(1981). In Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S.Ct. 980, 988 (1987), the Supreme
Court held that the trade or business status of a full-time gambler is established if
the taxpayer can show that the activity is "pursued full time, in good faith, and with
regularity, to the production of income for a livelihood."
5 In 1941, the Supreme Court concluded that the ordinary dictionary definition
of "business" was too broad and held that the activities of overseeing one's personal investments, even if performed full time, could never constitute a trade or
business. See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941). See also infra
notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing Higgins).
6 This standard was first established in 1941 by the Supreme Court in Higgins,
where the Court held that the determination that a taxpayer's activities constitute a
trade or business requires a review of all the facts and circumstances in each case.
Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217. See also infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (discussing Higgins).
7 This standard for defining a trade or business was first expressed in a sole
concurring opinion written in 1940 byJustice Frankfurter in Deputy v. du Pont, 308
U.S. 488 (1940). Justice Frankfurter concluded that " 'carrying on any trade or
business,' . . . involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of
goods or services." Id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also infra notes 5972 and accompanying text (discussing du Pont).
8 See, e.g., Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying facts and circumstances test), aft'd, 107 S.Ct. 980 (1987); Estate of Cull v.
Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying test that one must
hold himself out as offering goods or services); Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723
F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying test that one must hold himself out as
offering goods or services); Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362, 367 (1983)
(applying facts and circumstances test); Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1, 5
(1975) (applying test that one must hold himself out as offering goods or services).
9 The conflict involved whether a full-time gambler is engaged in a trade or
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Commissioner v. Groetzinger,'° the United States Supreme Court resolved this conflict by applying the "facts and circumstances" test
to a taxpayer engaged in full-time gambling activities. 1
In February 1978, Robert P. Groetzinger was terminated
from his employment with an Illinois manufacturer.12 During the
remaining portion of 1978, Groetzinger spent from sixty to
eighty hours per week gambling on parimutuel dog races.'"
Throughout this period of time, Groetzinger did not engage in
any other profession or employment other than gambling.' 4 He
also did not place bets for others, sell tips, or receive commissions for placing bets.' He bet solely on his own behalf.' 6
During 1978, Groetzinger realized gross gambling winnings
of $70,000 on total wagers of $72,032, resulting in a net gambling loss of $2,032.17 In addition to his gambling winnings,
Groetzinger received $6,498 in income from interest, dividends,
sales of stocks, and salary earned before he lost his job.' In
completing his 1978 federal tax return, Groetzinger reported as
income only $6,498 received from the non-gambling sources. 19
He did not report his gross income from the gambling winbusiness. Some of the circuit courts have applied Justice Frankfurter's "goods or
services" test to hold that the full-time gambler is not engaged in a trade or business. See Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148, 1152 (6th Cir. 1984);
Noto v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 440, 444 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1073 (3d
Cir. 1985). Other circuit courts have applied the Higgins "facts and circumstances"
test and have reached the opposite conclusion. Compare Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1985); Nipper v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 136, 137 (1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1984). Even the Tax Court
has vacillated over the appropriate standard to apply to determine the trade or
business status of the full-time gambler. Compare Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82
T.C. 793, 796-97 with Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362, 370-72 (1983) and
Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1, 6 (1975).
1o 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987).
11 Id. at 988.
12 Id. at 982. Prior to his termination, Groetzinger had been employed in marketing and sales for a period of 20 years. Id.
13 Id. In 1978, Groetzinger "went to the track 6 days a week for 48 weeks" and
spent a large portion of his time engaging in gambling-related activities. Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. Groetzinger maintained a daily record of his winnings and losses from his
wagering. Id.
18 Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 793, 794 n.4 (1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d
269 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987). The $6,498 income was comprised of "interest of $1,330, dividends of $1,337, taxable gain on the sale of stock
,. of $1,507, wages (earned prior to the termination of his job) of $1,323, and
'commissions'. . . of $1,000." 82 T.C. at 794 n.4.
19 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982.
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nings. 20 Further, he did not deduct his gambling losses either as
trade or business deductions, 2t or as itemized deductions 22 in
20 Id.
21 See id. Trade losses or business deductions may be deducted from a tax-

payer's gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 62(1) (1976 &
Supp. III 1978) (current version at I.R.C. § 62(1) (1982)). According to Code
§ 62(1) an individual's adjusted gross income is calculated by reducing gross income by:
"[t]rade and business deductions... which are attributable to a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, if such trade or business does not consist of services by the taxpayer as an employee." Id.
Adjusted gross income has been described as "an intermediate figure somewhere between gross income and taxable income which may be defined generally as
gross income minus business deductions." Gardiner v. United States, 391 F. Supp.
1202, 1207 (D. Utah 1975).
22 Itemized deductions can be described as certain personal expenditures permitted under the Internal Revenue Code as deductions from adjusted gross income
to arrive at taxable income. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (5th ed. 1979). Expenditures include medical expenses, state sales taxes, home mortgage interest, and
charitable gifts, among others. Id. Under the statutory provisions in effect from
1977 through 1986, an individual taxpayer could elect to deduct itemized deductions but only to the extent they exceeded a statutory minimum defined as the
"zero bracket amount." See I.R.C. § 63(b)-(d) (1976 Supp. 1 1977) (current version
at I.R.C. § 63(b)-(d) (Supp. IV 1986)) (concept of zero bracket amount replaced by
standard deduction). The zero bracket amount was incorporated into the tax computation as a nontaxable portion of income and functioned as a standard deduction
for those taxpayers who did not itemize their deductions. W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 324 (2d ed. 1979). Until 1977, this provision was known as
the standard deduction which was defined as the statutory amount taxpayers could
elect to deduct in lieu of itemizing their personal deductions without being required to keep records. Id. The standard deduction was originally established to
reduce the administrative burden of the Internal Revenue Service. B. BIrTKER,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
14.4, at 14-17 (1983). The zero
bracket amount was subsequently created to simplify the tax computation. S. REP.
No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-53, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 185, 229-33. Interestingly, under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress has
returned to the standard deduction believing that taxpayers were finding it difficult
to understand the concept of the zero bracket amount. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong.
2d Sess. 36 (1986).
Code section 63 defines taxable income, itemized deductions and the zero
bracket amount. I.R.C. § 63 (Supp. 1 1977) (current version at I.R.C. § 63 (Supp.
IV 1986)). The relevant provisions are as follows:
§ 63. Taxable income defined
(b) Individuals
For purposes of this subtitle, in the case of an individual, the term
"taxable income" means adjusted gross income -

(1)
(c)

reduced by the sum of (A) the excess itemized deductions....

Excess itemized deductions
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "excess itemized deductions" means the excess, (if any) of (1) the itemized deductions, over
(2) the zero bracket amount
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calculating his adjusted gross income.2 3
Upon auditing Groetzinger's 1978 return, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) found that the entire
amount of Groetzinger's gambling winnings were includible in
his gross earnings.2 4 Moreover, the Commissioner concluded
that Groetzinger's gambling losses were deductible as itemized
deductions, but only to the extent of his gambling winnings. 2 5
Thus, only $70,000 of Groetzinger's gambling losses constituted
itemized deductions.26 Under the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
(d)

Zero bracket amount
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "zero bracket amount"
means (1) $3,200 in the case of(A) a joint return under section 6013, or
(B) a surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a))
(2) $2,200 in the case of an individual who is not married and who
is not a surviving spouse (as so defined)
(3) $1,600 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return, or
(4) zero in any other case.
(f)

Itemized deductions
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "itemized deductions" means
the deductions allowable by this chapter other than(1) the deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross
income....
d.

23 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982. Groetzinger did not deduct the net gambling
loss of $2,032 in arriving at adjusted gross income but he did report the loss on
Schedule E or "Supplemental Income Schedule." Id. at 982 n.3.
24 Id. at 982.
25 Id. Code section 165 governs the deductibility of wagering losses and specifically allows a deduction for such losses, but only to the extent of winnings. See
I.R.C. § 165 (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 165 (1982)). Section 165 states in
pertinent part:
(a) General Rule
There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the
taxable year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise.

(c)

Limitation on losses of individuals
In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection
(a) shall be limited to(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though
not connected with a trade or business ....
(d)

Wagering losses
Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such transactions.
Id.
26

Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982.
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as it existed in 1978, the Commissioner found that Groetzinger's
gambling losses constituted itemized deductions and therefore a
portion of the $70,000 losses should have been included as an
"item of tax preference ' 2 7 subject to the minimum tax. 28 Conse-

quently, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to
27 Id. Under the Commissioner's determination, Groetzinger's gambling losses
constituted itemized deductions subject to the minimum tax provision. See I.R.C.
§§ 56(a), 57(a)(1), 57(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 55,
56, 57 (Supp. IV 1986)). For tax years beginning after 1982, deductions for gambling losses are specifically excluded from the minimum tax provision. See I.R.C.
§§ 55(b), 55(e)(l)(A) (1982) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 55, 56, 57 (Supp. IV
1986)); I.R.C. § 165 (d) (1982). Under the statutory scheme in effect in 1978, deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income, which primarily include
trade or business deductions, were excluded as items of tax preference and, therefore, not subject to the minimum tax provision. See I.R.C. § 57(b)(1)(A) (1976 &
Supp. 11977) (current version at I.R.C. § 57 (Supp. IV 1986)). See also infra note 28
and accompanying text for discussion of the minimum tax provision.
28 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982. In 1969, Congress enacted the minimum tax
provisions in response to a growing concern that many high income taxpayers, by
virtue of various tax relief provisions, were able to substantially avoid taxation. See
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., reprintedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2027, 2142. To remedy this apparent abuse, Congress developed a statutory
scheme whereby certain items of income and specified deductions would be defined
as items of tax preference subject to a minimum tax. See id. at 2143-49. Upon
computing the minimum tax liability, the taxpayer is required to pay the minimum
tax liability plus his regular tax liability. See id. at 2144.
The characterization of Groetzinger's gambling losses as itemized deductions
caused those losses to fall under the item of tax preference defined as adjusted
itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 57(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1977) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 57 (Supp. IV 1986)). Adjusted itemized deductions is defined as an amount by
which the sum of all deductions for the taxable year, other than certain specified
deductions, which include trade or business deductions, exceed a certain percentage of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. See id. It is this amount that is subject
to the minimum tax provision. See I.R.C. § 56(a) (1976) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 55 (Supp. IV 1986)).
Sections 56 and 57 of the code provide the statutory scheme for the imposition
of the minimum tax provision for 1978. I.R.C. §§ 56, 57 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977)
(current version at I.R.C. §§ 56, 57 (Supp. IV 1986)). The relevant provisions of
section 56 read:
§ 56. Imposition of Tax.
(a) General Rule
In addition to the other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is
hereby imposed for each taxable year, with respect to the income of
every person, a tax equal to 15 percent of the amount by which the sum
of the items of tax preference exceeds the greater of(1) $10,000 or
(2) the regular tax deduction for the taxable year (as determined
under subsection (c)).
I.R.C. § 56 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) (current version at I.R.C. § 56 (Supp. IV 1986)).
Section 57 provides in pertinent part:
§ 57. Items of tax preference
(a) In General
For purposes of this part, the items of tax preference are-
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Groetzinger in the amount of $2,142, for failure to pay the minimum tax.29
Groetzinger subsequently filed a petition for redeterriiination of the deficiency with the United States Tax Court. ° The
tax court held that Groetzinger's gambling activities were sufficiently frequent and "substantial to constitute a trade or business," and as a result, his gambling losses should not have been
subject to the minimum tax provision. 3 ' In so holding, the tax
court rejected the "goods or services" test applied by United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Gajewski v. Commissioner, and instead followed its prior decision in Ditunno v.
Commissioner.3" In Ditunno, the tax court held that the determination of whether a taxpayer's activities constitute a traie or business requires an examination of all the facts and circumstances in
each case.3 4 The tax court found the facts in Groetzinger to be virtually indistinguishable from the facts in Ditunno, and thus concluded that Groetzinger was, in fact, engaged in the trade or
business of gambling."
(1)

Adjusted itemized deductions
An amount equal to the adjusted itemized deductions for the
taxable year (as determined under subsection (b)).
(b)

Adjusted itemized deductions
(1) In General
For purposes of paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the amount of
the adjusted itemized deductions for any taxable year is the amount
by which the sum of the deductions for the taxable year other than(A) deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross
income....
exceeds 60 percent (but does not exceed 100 percent) of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the taxable year.
I.R.C. § 57 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) (current version at I.R.C. § 56 (Supp. IV 1986)).
29 See Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982.
30 Id. at 982.
31 See Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 793, 803 (1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 269
(7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987).
32 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983). In Gajewski, the court held that in order for a
taxpayer to be considered as carrying on a trade or business he must, at a minimum, hold himself out publicly as offering goods or services. Id. at 1067. The
Second Circuit held that the activities of a full-time gambler do not constitute a
trade or business because he gambles solely for his own benefit and as such does
not offer goods or services for sale to others. Id. See also Groetzinger, 82 T.C. at 796803 (rejecting the ruling of Gajewski).
33 80 T.C. 362 (1983). See also Groetzinger, 82 T.C. at 803 (adopting test articulated in Ditunno).
34 Ditunno, 80 T.C. at 370-72. The Ditunno court held that the taxpayer's gambling activities constituted a trade or business. Id. at 372.
35 Groetzinger, 82 T.C. at 796.
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This decision of the tax court was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.36 The Seventh
Circuit held that Groetzinger was not precluded from characterizing his gambling activities as a trade or business merely because
he failed to offer goods or services for sale to others. 37 After reviewing all the facts and circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that Groetzinger was engaged in the trade or business of
gambling.38 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,39 and held that a full-time gambler who bets solely for his
own benefit is engaged in a trade or business as contemplated
under sections 162(a)4 ° and 62(1)" t of the Code.42
Neither Congress nor the United States Treasury Department has provided a concrete definition for the term trade or
business.4 3 Thus, the courts have been left with the difficult task
of defining the term within a variety of statutory contexts.44
36 Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.
Ct. 980 (1987).
37 See id. at 276-77.
38 See id. at 274. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Groetzinger spent virtually all his time on gambling related activities with the intention of earning a living
from those endeavors. See id.
39 106 S. Ct. 1456 (1986). The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to a conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the issue of whether gambling
is a trade or business. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 983 & n.5.
40 I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982)). Section
162(a) of the Code states that a deduction shall be allowed for all "ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business." Id.
41 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 62(1)).
42 See Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 981, 988. The specific issue raised by the facts in
Groetzinger is whether full-time gambling activities constitute a trade or business
under Code section 62(1). Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 793, 795 (1984),
aff'd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987). On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the Commissioner concede[d] that the meaning of the term 'trade or business' is the same under [sections] 62(1) and 162(a),"
because both Code sections involve the issue of deductibility of expenses related to
a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 271 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court, therefore, confined its holding to these particular Code sections. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 981. The Seventh Circuit pointed out
that "the precise meaning or connotation of the term [trade or business] appears to
vary depending upon the [Code] provision in which it is used." Groetzinger, 771
F.2d at 271 (citing Steffens v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 478, 482 (11 th Cir. 1983));
4AJ. MERTENS, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON § 25.08 (1979)).
43 There are, however, several Code sections where the term "trade or business" is specifically defined for limited purposes. See supra note 2.
44 The trade or business issue arises most often in determining whether trade or
business expenses are deductible under Code section 162. Boyle, supra note 1, at
738. Code section 162 provides that three requirements must be met before an
expense may be deducted. First, the expense must be ordinary and necessary; second, the expense must be paid or incurred during the taxable year; and third, the
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However, the courts. have been unable to provide an authoritative definition that may be applied broadly in all contexts.4"
In an early case, Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. ,46 the Supreme Court
made its first significant attempt at defining the term trade or
business.47 In Flint, the Supreme Court decided several issues
pertaining to the Corporation Tax Law of 1909.48 One such issue was whether the particular companies involved in the case
were engaged in business and, thereby, subject to the corporate
tax provisions. 49 In defining the term "business" the Court referred to the ordinary dictionary definition of the term and stated
that " '[b]usiness' is a very comprehensive term and embraces
everything about which a person can be employed. [It is] [t]hat
which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit."50 Based upon this definition, the
Court held that the managing of property constituted carrying on
a business, and as such, the taxpayer was subject to the corporation tax. 5 '

In 1935, the Supreme Court addressed the trade or business
question in the context of a securities trader in Snyder v. Commissioner.5 2 Snyder involved an individual who regularly traded on
expense must be incurred while carrying on a trade or business. See I.R.C. § 162(a)
(1982). A deduction is not permitted unless all three requirements are met. Boyle,
supra note 1, at 738 n.8. The "paid or incurred" requirement determines when the
expense may be deducted. Id. The "ordinary and necessary" requirement permits
a deduction for an expense only if it is both "ordinary," in the sense that the expense is typical or common for the business environment within which it is incurred, and "necessary," in the sense that the expense is required to further some
appropriate business purpose. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-15
(1933). Only when it is determined that the "paid orincurred" and the "ordinary
and necessary" requirements have been met is the trade or business issue addressed. Boyle, supra note 1, at 738 n.8. When deciding this question, all of the
taxpayer's related activities are considered together to determine if a trade or business exists. Id.
45 See Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d, at 271 (citing 1 B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs
20.1.2 (1981)).
46 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
47 See id. at 171. Flint was decided prior to the enactment of all current income
tax laws and upheld the constitutionality of the Corporation Tax of 1909 which
imposed an "excise tax on doing business in corporate form." Boyle, supra note 1,
at 740 n.27.
48 See Flint, 220 U.S. at 112-13; see also supra note 1 (discussing Corporation Tax
Law of 1909, ch.6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17 (1909)).
49 See Flint, 220 U.S. at 171.
50 The Supreme Court in Flint used the definition of the term "business" as
contained in both Black's Law Dictionary and Bouvier's Law Dictionary. See id. (citation omitted).
51 Id.
52 295 U.S. 134 (1935).
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margin in the stock of one particular company for the purpose of
increasing his holding in that company.5" The Commissioner issued a deficiency assessment against the taxpayer for failure to
54
pay the tax due on the capital gains from the margin trading.
In upholding the deficiency assessment, Justice Brandeis, writing
for the court, held that an investor who merely seeks to increase
his holdings in a particular stock is not engaged in a trade or
business. 55 Justice Brandeis observed that the board of tax appeals previously had held that a taxpayer who spends a substantial portion of his time as a trader on the stock exchanges may
treat losses incurred as those sustained in the course of that taxpayer's trade or business.56 He further noted, however, that the
taxpayer in Snyder did not show sufficient facts to establish that
his activities should be "characterized as a 'trader on an exchange who makes a living in buying and selling securities.' -57
Therefore, in refusing to classify the taxpayer's activities as a
trade or business, the Snyder Court had distinguished between an
active trader in securities and an ordinary investor.58
In 1940, the Supreme Court again addressed the trade or
business issue in Deputy v. du Pont.59 In du Pont, the taxpayer, a
member of the du Pont family, owned a sixteen-percent interest
in the stock of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company.6° The du
53 See id. at 135-36.
54 Id. at 136. Due to the method used to account for his stock sales the taxpayer
did not report profits on any of his stock transactions during the year. See id. at 13637. The taxpayer would match the sales price of the stock sold with the price of his
last acquired stock which, due to the appreciated value of the stock, would produce
minimal or no gain. See id. The Commissioner concluded, however, that the taxpayer should have matched the sales price of the stock sold to purchases made in
earlier years consistent with the so-called "first-in-first-out" regulations in existence at that time. See id. at 136. This produced a large amount of unreported gains
resulting in the Commissioner's deficiency assessment. See id.
55 Id. at 138-39. The taxpayer in Snyder argued that the first-in-first-out regulation, for determining gains or losses on sales of securities, should not be applied
"to sales made in the course of a 'business of trading on the stock exchange.'" Id.
at 137-38.
56 Id. at 139.

57 Id. (citing Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929); Mente v.
Eisner, 266 F. 161 (2d Cir. 1920)).
58 See id. 137-39. Subsequent cases have distinguished an active trader in securities from the full-time investor, holding that the active trader is engaged in a trade
or business. See, e.g., Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Purvis v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.
1976); Fuld v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1943); Levin v. United States,
597 F.2d 760 (Ct. CI. 1979).
59 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
60 Id. at 490.
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Pont Company decided that for business reasons their new key
executives should own an equity interest in the company. 6 ' Due
to legal and economic restrictions, however, the company was
unable to make a direct sale of its stock to these executives.62 As
a result, the taxpayer chose to sell the stock to the key executives
himself, but because he did not own the required number of
shares, he borrowed the shares from other shareholders. 63 As

part of the agreement with the other shareholders, the taxpayer
agreed to pay the lenders cash in the amount of the dividends
paid on the shares for the period of time the shares were on
loan.64 During the tax year in question, the taxpayer expended
almost $648,00065 to carry out this plan and deducted this
amount as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense. 66
The Court initially assumed for the sake of argument that
the taxpayer's activities of "conserving and enhancing his estate"
constituted a trade or business. 67 The majority, however, disallowed the deduction because the payments were not "ordinary
61 Id. For business reasons the du Pont Company wanted to give 9000 shares of
its common stock to nine men comprising the newly formed executive committee.
Id.
62 Id. The du Pont Company did not hold a sufficient amount of shares in its
treasury to complete the transaction and was unable to issue new shares without
implicating the preemptive rights of existing shareholders. Id. at 490 n. 1. In addition, the required number of shares could not be purchased on the market without
causing a substantial rise in the price per share. Id.
63 Id. at 490-91. The taxpayer directly owned 74 shares, which was insufficient
to cover the required sale of 9000 shares. Id. at 491 n.2. In addition, the taxpayer
owned a "reversionary interest in two trusts which held 24,000 shares" of du Pont
stock and 38% interest in the stock of a company which held 183,000 du Pont
shares. Id. Since the taxpayer only had access to 74 shares, he borrowed the 9000
shares from other shareholders and then proceeded to sell 1000 shares to each of
the nine key executives. Id. at 491.
64 See id. at 492.
65 Id. This amount included $567,648 which represented dividends received by
the taxpayer during the loan period and $80,064 in federal income tax imposed on
the lender as a result of the dividend payment received by them. Id. In accordance
with the loan agreement, the taxpayer was required to pay the sum of these two
amounts to the lender. Id;
66 Id. at 489. The taxpayer sought to claim the deduction under section 23(a) of
the Revenue Act of 1928, the predecessor of the current Code section 162(a). Id. at
489-90. See generally Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 23(a), 45 Stat. 791, 799 (current version at I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982)). Section 23(a) provided that a reduction
shall be allowed in computing net income for "[a]ll ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Id. The taxpayer contended that the payments made to complete the stock
sales were ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the business of "conserving and enhancing his estate." See du Pont, 308 U.S. at 489-90.
67 du Pont, 308 U.S. at 493.
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and necessary. '68 In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter
disagreed with the majority's rationale.69 The Justice posited
that the taxpayer's deduction should have been disallowed because he was not engaged in a trade or business. 70 Justice Frankfurter stated that the carrying on of a trade or business "involves
holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of
goods or services."'' 7 According to Justice Frankfurter, the taxpayer did not hold himself out as such in this case.72
A year later, in 1941, the Supreme Court was squarely faced
with the trade or business question in Higgins v. Commissioner.73 In
Higgins, the taxpayer spent a substantial portion of his time managing his extensive investments in real estate and securities. 4 To
assist him in overseeing his investment interests, the taxpayer
hired a staff and rented office space. 75 He deducted the salaries
and other costs associated with the management of his investments as ordinary and necessary expenses associated with a trade
or business. 76 The Commissioner conceded that the activities re-

lating to the real estate investments constituted a business, but
contended that the expenses relating to the securities were not
incurred in the pursuit of a trade or business.77
The Court observed that the term trade or business has
never been defined by Congress or the Treasury and rejected the
broad definition of "business" established in Flint.78 The Higgins
Court concluded that in determining "whether the activities of a
68 See id. The Court found that the claimed deduction failed for two reasons. See
id. First, the payments were not made in connection with the taxpayer's business of
enhancing his estate but were directly related to the business of du Pont. Id. at 494.
The Court stated that the stock transactions originated from the company's desire
to increase its management efficiency, and the taxpayer offered to supply the required amount of stock because the company could not legally effectuate the sale.
Id. Second, the payments were not "ordinary," because a shareholder engaged in
the business of "conserving and enhancing his estate" does not ordinarily finance a
stock purchase plan for the executives of his company. Id. at 494-96.
69 See id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
74 Id. at 213.
75 Id. at 213-14.
76 Id. In Higgins, the taxpayer claimed the deduction under section 23(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1932. Id. See generally Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 23(a), 47
Stat. 169 (current version at I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982)).
77 See Higgins, 312 U.S. at 214.
78 Id. at 215-17. The Higgins Court stated that the definition of "business" articulated by the Court in Flint applied solely to determine whether certain corporations were taxed under the corporation tax law and was "not controlling in this
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taxpayer are 'carrying on a business' requires an examination of
the facts in each case." '79 Applying the "facts and circumstances"
test, the Court determined that the facts [of this case] were not
sufficient as a matter of law to allow the taxpayer to claim his
activities as a trade or business.8 0 The Court held that the expenses incurred in managing one's personal investment activities
are not deductible as expenses incurred as a trade or business."'
Subsequent cases have demonstrated the Court's unwillingness to revert back to Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services"
test. 82 It was not until 1974, in Snow v. Commissioner,"3 that the

Supreme Court once again addressed the "goods or services
test" in defining a trade or business.84 The narrow issue
dissimilar inquiry." Id. at 217. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing Flint).
79 Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217.
80 Id. at 218.
81 Id. More specifically, the Higgins Court held that "[n]o matter how large the
estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be," the taxpayer's
activities of managing his personal investments were not legally sufficient to constitute a trade or business. Id. Congress, responding to the Higgins decision, enacted
in 1942 what is currently Code section 212. See 88 CONG. REc. 6376 (1942). See also
I.R.C. § 212 (1982) (permitting a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred "for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income."). This statutory change, however, did not
broaden the definition of trade or business to include the maintenance and conservation of personal investments. See 88 CONG. REC. 6376 (1942). Congress merely
intended to remove the inequity caused by the Higgins decision by permitting taxpayers to "deduct expenses incurred for the production or collection of income
whether or not such expenses are connected with the taxpayer's trade or business."
Id.
82 See, e.g., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121 (1941);
United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127 (1941). In these two cases, the Court was once
again given the opportunity to apply the "facts and circumstances" in determining
the deductibility of estate and trust expenses. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 313
U.S. at 123-24; Pyne, 313 U.S. at 128. In City Bank Farmers Trust Co., the Commissioner did not permit a trust to deduct trustee fees as a business expense. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 313 U.S. at 124. In Pyne, the Commissioner did not allow a business deduction for attorney fees relating to the administration of an estate. Pyne,
313 U.S. at 128-29. In these companion cases, the Court held that the expenses
relating to the trust and estate were not deductible as expenses incurred while carrying on a trade or business. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 313 U.S. at 126; Pyne,
313 U.S. at 130-32. The Court, relying on Higgins, reasoned that because the activities surrounding the administration of trusts and estates primarily involve the conservation and maintenance of assets, such activities do not constitute a trade or
business. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 313 U.S. at 125-26; Pyne, 313 U.S. at 13032. It should be noted that while the Court found Higgins to be the controlling law,
no reference was made to Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services" test. See City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 313 U.S. at 121; Pyne, 313 U.S. at 127.
83 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
84 See id. at 502-03.

1988]

NOTES

779

presented by Snow was whether the taxpayer could deduct research and development costs as trade or business expenses
under Code section 174.85 The taxpayer was a partner in a partnership formed for the purpose of developing and marketing a
special purpose invention. 6 In the year of formation, the partnership did not attempt any sales activity but incurred substantial
expenses that were claimed as deductible under section 174.87
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the ground that
since no sales activity had been attempted, the partnership expenses were not incurred in connection with a trade or business. 8 Although the tax court and the Sixth Circuit had upheld
the Commissioner's determination, 9 the Supreme Court
reversed. 90
After reviewing the legislative history, the Court maintained
that Congress enacted section 174 with the intent of broadening
the concept of a trade or business beyond that expressed by Justice Frankfurter in his du Pont concurrence. 9 ' The Court further
stated that by broadening the concept of a trade or business
under section 174, Congress sought to achieve its purpose of encouraging the research and development of new products.9 2
With this legislative history as a backdrop, the Court concluded
that the partnership's failure to attempt sales activity was irrelevant, and held that the research and development expenses were
deductible under section 174.93

In Gentile v. Commissioner,94 the tax court was faced with defining a trade or business in the context of the self-employment
tax.9 5 Gentile involved the imposition of the self-employment tax
85 Id. at 501. Section 174 permits a deduction for research and development
expenses incurred in a trade or business. See I.R.C. § 174 (1970) (current version
at I.R.C. § 174 (1982) as amended by I.R.C. § 174 (Supp. IV 1986)).
86 Snow, 416 U.S. at 501-02.
87 Id.
88 See Snow v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 585, 593-94 (1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 1029
(6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 500 (1974). The Tax Court determined that due to
the partnership's lack of sales activity, it was not holding itself out as selling goods
or services to others and, therefore, was not engaged in a trade or business. Id. at
596-97.
89 Snow, 416 U.S. at 501.
90 Id. at 504.
91 See id. at 502-04.
92 Id. at 503-04.
93 See id. at 504.
94 65 T.C. 1 (1975).
95 Id. at 3. Genti/e involved the application of Code section 1401, as it existed in
1971. See id. Section 1401 imposed a tax on the "self-employment income" of individuals. See I.R.C. § 1401 (1970) (current version at I.R.C. § 1401 (Supp. IV
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on a taxpayer whose total reported earnings were derived from
gambling activities.96 The sole issue presented to the tax court
was whether the gambling activities of the taxpayer constituted a
trade or business, thereby subjecting his gambling winnings to
the self-employment tax.97 A major portion of the taxpayer's
gambling winnings was derived from horse racing. 98 He would
visit various racetracks from one to four times per week and
would spend a substantial portion of his time away from the track
studying racing forms. 99 He never placed bets for others or received compensation for placing bets, nor did he operate a gambling establishment.' 0 He gambled solely for his own benefit.' 0 '
The taxpayer argued that his gambling activities did not constitute a trade or business because he did not hold himself out to
others as offering goods or services. 0 2 The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business and
argued that the definition of a trade or business should not be
confined to "the offering of goods or services to others."'0 3 Instead, the Commissioner maintained that the term should be
defined as "an individual's everyday effort to earn a living, characterized by continuity, regularity, and profit motive."'O° The tax
court agreed that the Commissioner's definition included some
elements of "carrying on a trade or business," but that these
elements alone were insufficient. 10 5 The tax court noted that the
Supreme Court, in Snow, had reaffirmed the application of the
"goods or services" test as a determinative factor in defining
1986)). Section 1402(b) defined "self-employment income" as "net earnings from
self-employment," which was specified in section 1402(a), as "gross income derived
by an individual from any 'trade or business.'" I.R.C. § 1402(a)-(b) (1970 & Supp.
1 1971) (current version at I.R.C. § 1402 (1982), as amended by I.R.C. § 1402 (Supp.
IV 1986)). Section 1402(c) defined the term "trade or business" and provided that
"the term 'trade or business,' when used with reference to self-employment income
or net earnings from self-employment, shall have the same meaning as when used
in section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses)." I.R.C. § 1402(c) (1970)
(current version at I.R.C. § 1402(c) (Supp. IV 1986)).
96 Gentile, 65 T.C. at 1-3.
97 Id. at 3.
98 Id. at 2. The taxpayer engaged in various gambling activities including racetrack betting and wagering on a variety of other sporting events. Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 3.
103 Id.
104

Id.

105 Id. at 4.
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whether an activity is a trade or business.1 "6
The tax court held that the taxpayer was not engaged in a
trade or business because the Commissioner failed to demonstrate that Gentile's activities constituted holding himself out to
others as offering goods or services. 10 7 As a consequence, Gentile's gambling winnings "were not subject to the self-employment tax."' 1 8 Moreover, the court pointed out that Gentile's
gambling activities were analogous to the managing of one's own
investment portfolio, an activity that clearly did not constitute a
trade or business. 0 9
The tax court in 1983, in Ditunno v. Commissioner,I1 0 reconsid-

ered the continued use of the "goods or services" test in defining
a trade or business."' In Ditunno, where the application of the
minimum tax provision was at issue the tax court examined
whether a full-time gambler was engaged in a trade or business." 2 For each of the years 1977 through 1979, the taxpayer
reported gambling winnings of approximately $60,000 and de106
107

Id. at 5.

See id. at 6. The tax court concluded that by merely "stepping up to the betting window, [the taxpayer] was not holding himself out as offering goods or services to anyone." Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218). The tax court, relying on Higgins, found
that the activities of a full-time gambler were analogous to the activities of one who
manages his own personal investments or estate, and that clearly such activities do
not constitute a trade or business. Id.
110 80 T.C. 362 (1983).
Il1 See id. at 366-67.
112 Id. at 364-66. The minimum tax provisions in effect for the years in question,
1977 through 1979, imposed a minimum tax on certain deductions defined as
"items of tax preference." See I.R.C. §§ 56(a), 57(a)(1), 57(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. I
1977) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 55, 56, 57 (Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. §§ 56(a),
57(a)(1), 57(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. II1978) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 55, 56, 57
(Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. §§ 55(a), 55(b), 57(a)(1), 57(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. III) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 55, 56, 57 (Supp. VI 1986)). Items of tax preference for
each of the years in question included many deductions allowable under the Code,
but did not include deductions allowable in computing adjusted gross income
under Code section 62. See id. Adjusted gross income is defined under section 62
as gross income less certain deductions. I.R.C. § 62 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) (current
version at I.R.C. § 62 (Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. § 62 (1976 & Supp. 111978) (current
version at I.R.C. § 62 (Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. § 62 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (current version at I.R.C. § 62 (Supp. IV 1986)). The deductions relevant to the facts
in Ditunno are the trade or business deductions specified under Code section 62(1),
which permits deductions only if they are "attributable to a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer...." I.R.C. § 62(1) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977) (current version
at I.R.C. § 62(1) (Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. § 62(1) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (current
version at I.R.C. § 62(1) (1986 & Supp. IV)); I.R.C. § 62(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
(current version at I.R.C. § 62(1) (Supp. IV 1986)). Therefore, if the taxpayer's
only deductions for the taxable year were those allowable under Code section
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ducted gambling losses for nearly the same amount.11 3 Based
upon the tax court's decision in Gentile, the Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's gambling activities did not constitute a
trade or business. 14 The Commissioner argued that because the
taxpayer was not engaged in the trade or business of gambling,
his gambling losses were not deductible under Code section
62(1) in arriving at his adjusted gross income.' 15 Instead, the
Commissioner maintained that the gambling losses should have
been characterized as itemized deductions, which would have
subjected the losses to the minimum tax on tax preference
items. 116
Upon reconsidering the "goods or services" test as applied
by the tax court in Gentile, the Ditunno court determined that the
'
test was "overly restrictive."117
The tax court recognized that the
Gentile court's reliance on Snow, as reaffirming the "goods or services" test, was misplaced. "8 The Ditunno court further noted that
the reference made to Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services"
test by the Supreme Court in Snow did not indicate that Court's
approval of this definition." ' 9 The tax court concluded that Snow
was merely referring to the "goods or services" test as an example of a restrictive definition of a trade or business. 120 The
Ditunno court held that the proper test to determine whether a
taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business is the test established
by the Supreme Court in Higgins. 12 1 The court observed that the
test established in Higgins "requires an examination of all the
22
facts and circumstances in each case."'
In applying the "facts and circumstances" test the tax court
concluded that Ditunno's gambling activities constituted a trade
or business. 123 To support this conclusion, the court distinguished Ditunno's gambling activities from the activities of the
taxpayer in Higgins.'1 4 The court noted that Ditunno, unlike the
62(1), then he would not be subject to the minimum tax provisions under Code
section 56 or 55. Ditunno, 80 T.C. at 365 & 365 n.5.
113 Ditunno, 80 T.C. at 364.
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 366.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 370.
See id.

See id. at 370-71.
See id.

Id. at 372.
Id. at 371-72.
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taxpayer in Higgins, was not a passive investor but rather an active gambler who devoted his full time to gambling-relatedactivities. 125
The Second Circuit, in Gajewski v. Commissioner,12 6 was given
the tax court's rejection of the
the first opportunity to consider
"goods or services" test. 127 Gajewski involved the same issue as
Ditunno, whether a full-time gambler is engaged in a trade or
business, thereby excluding his gambling losses from the minimum tax provision.'12 Relying on the "goods or services" test to
dispose of the issue, the Second Circuit held that full-time gambling activities did not constitute a trade or business. 129 The Second Circuit posited that the Supreme Court in Snow had
implicitly adopted the "goods or services" test.' 30 Moreover, the
court observed that the tax court and other circuits have either
13
implicitly or explicitly approved the "goods or services" test.
The Second Circuit viewed the "goods or services" test as the
appropriate minimum standard for determining whether a taxpayer's activities constituted a trade or business. 13 2 The court labeled the "facts and circumstances" approach as a "non-test"
because it did not establish a legal standard for identifying which
"facts and circumstances" were sufficient to determine the existence of a trade or business.13 3 The Second Circuit concluded
that in order for a taxpayer to prove that his activities constitute a
trade or business he must show, at a minimum, that he held
"himself out to others as offering goods or services." 134 The
125 Id. at 371. The court concluded that the full-time gambling activities of
Ditunno were in sharp contrast with the taxpayer who invested his money in relatively stable, long-term investments and whose only activity is the collection of dividends and interest. Id.
126 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983).
127 See id. at 1065-67.
128 Id. at 1063.
129 Id. at 1067.
130 Id. at 1065.
131 Id. at 1066. See, e.g., Weiberg v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 434, 437 (8th Cir.
1981); Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968); McDowell v.
Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1961); Daily Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 135
F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 556, 561 (4th Cir.
1942); Helvering v. Wilmington Trust Co., 124 F.2d 156, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1941),
rev'd on other rounds, 316 U.S. 164 (1942).
132 Gajewski, 723 F.2d at 1066.
133 Id. The court described the "facts and circumstances" test as merely a "predicate for [the] application of a legal test." Id. The Second Circuit stated that "[one
must first find the 'facts and circumstances' in every case before applying the
proper [legal] standard to those facts." Id.

134

Id. at 1067.
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Second Circuit added that the taxpayer must also show that the
activity in question is a commercial activity from which he seeks
to earn a living.1 35 The court asserted that this would be a more
reasonable standard for defining a trade or business than the
36
amorphous "facts or circumstances" test.'
In Estate of Cull v. Commissioner,137 the Sixth Circuit addressed
the trade or business issue under facts similar to Ditunno.' 38 The
Sixth Circuit held that one who gambles full time for his own
benefit is not engaged in a trade or business because he has not
held himself out as offering goods or services to others.' 39 The
Sixth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion in Gajewski, that the "facts and circumstances" test is a "non-test" because it failed to identify what "facts or circumstances" were
necessary to define the taxpayer's activity as a trade or business.' 40 The court posited, however, that the "facts and circumstances" test and the "goods or services" test were clearly in
harmony with one another.' 4 ' The court explained that the Higgins "facts and circumstances" test stood for the general proposition that the determination of what constitutes a trade or
business is merely a question of fact while the "goods or services" test established a minimum standard to determine which
1 42
facts are sufficient to find that a trade or business exists.
As prior law reflects, conflict existed among the various
lower courts regarding the proper standard to be applied in deciding whether a full time gambler is engaged in a trade or business. 4 3 Commissioner v. Groetzinger marks the Supreme Court's
most recent attempt to clarify the appropriate standard in deciding the trade or business issue. 144 In addressing this issue, the
Court flatly rejected Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services"
test. 145
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun traced the judicial
history behind the Supreme Court's attempt at establishing the
135
136

See id. at 1066.
Id. at 1067.

'37

746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984).
1149-50.
1152.
See id. at 1151.
Id.

138 See id. at
139 See id. at
140
141
142

Id.

143 See Groetzinger, 107

S. Ct. at 983.

See generally id. at 980.
145 Id. at 987.
144
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appropriate standard for defining a trade or business.146 The
Justice observed that the Court's prior cases provided little guidance for deciding whether the activities of a full-time gambler
should be afforded the status of a trade or business. 147 The
Court concluded that although an activity that would satisfy Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services" test would certainly qualify
as a trade or business, this test was "not an absolute prerequisite."' 4 8 The Justice added, that such a test would only breed
litigation over the definition of "goods or services" and the
meaning of "holding one's self out"' 49 as engaged in such an activity. Accordingly, Justice Blackmun formally rejected the
"goods or services" test which he found was never adopted by
the Court.

50

In rejecting the "goods or services" test, Justice Blackmun
concluded that to constitute a trade or business, the taxpayer's
activities must be pursued with continuity and regularity and with
the primary purpose of earning a living. 15 ' A mere hobby or occasional activity is not sufficient. 15 2 To resolve this issue, the majority chose to adhere to the familiar formulation established by
the Supreme Court in Higgins, which "requires an examination of
146 See id. at 983-96. The Court, while discussing the Higgins decision, made several interesting observations. See id. at 985. The Court pointed out that Justice
Frankfurter, who was a member of the Higgins Court, did not write a separate opinion and Justice Reed, who joined in Justice Frankfurter's du Pont concurrence, authored the Higgins opinion. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that the Higgins
Court did not cite to the du Pont opinion, and concluded that the Court did not
considerJustice Frankfurter's du Pont concurrence in deciding the trade or business
issue. Id. The Groetzinger Court also noted that if Justice Frankfurter's "goods or
services" test was adopted, Higgins would have been disposed of "automatically."
Id.
147 Id. at 986. The Court found Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services" test to
be nothing more than a passing remark made by a minority of the Court, which
never has been adopted as controlling law. Id. The Court also found that the
"facts and circumstances" test, announced in Higgins, does not provide a helpful
standard. Id.
148 Id. at 987.
149 Id. Justice Blackmun also stated that besides gambling, practically every other
activity would satisfy the "goods or services" test. Id. The Court observed that all
of the gambling cases which held that a trade or business did not exist adopted the
"goods or services" test. Id. at 987 n.14 (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court
noted that these same courts never referred to the "goods or services" test in nongambling cases. Id. The Court noted that this trend indicates that these courts
were carving out a separate set of rules for full-time gamblers not warranted by the
Code. Id.
150 Id. at 987.
151 d.
152 Id.
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all the facts in each case."'' 5 3

In reaching its conclusions, the Court refused to provide a
uniform definition of the term trade or business that could be
applied broadly.' 54 The Court stated that the difficulty in providing one all-encompassing definition is in the pervasiveness of the
term throughout the Code and in the variety of contexts in which
the term is used.' 55 Justice Blackmun concluded that establishing
one broad definition that would apply in all situations would produce uncertainty regarding the overall integrity of the Code. 5 6
Justice White joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion. 57 The Justice asserted that
Congress implicitly accepted the Tax Court's holding in Gentile,
that full-time gambling does not constitute a trade or business,
when it amended the Code in 1982 to exclude gambling losses
from the minimum tax provision. 1 58 The dissent reached this

conclusion because it found that when computing the minimum
tax, under the 1982 amendments, a double deduction for gambling losses would result if gambling losses were characterized as
trade or business deductions.' 59 The dissent further reasoned
that because Congress did not intend to permit this double deduction, gambling losses could not be characterized as trade or
business expenses. 16° Accordingly, the dissent concluded that
153 Id. at 988.
154 See id.
155 Id.
156 Id. The Court stated: "We leave repair or revision, if any be needed, which
we doubt, to the Congress where we feel, at this late date, the ultimate responsibility rests." Id.
157 Id. at 988 (White, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 988-89 (White, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text (discussing Genti). Under the 1982 amendments, the total amount of
income subject to the minimum tax is equal to adjusted gross income, reduced by
certain specified amounts, including gambling losses, and increased by items of tax
preference. See I.R.C. §§ 55(b), 55(e)(1)(A) (1982) (current version at I.R.C. § 55
(Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. § 165(d) (1982).
159 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988 (White, J., dissenting). The Court explained that
if full-time gambling is considered a trade or business, then the gambling losses
incurred would be characterized as trade or business expenses deductible from
gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income, but only to the extent of gambling
winnings. Id. See also I.R.C. § 62(1) (1982); I.R.C. § 165(d) (1982). The Court
noted that by permitting a second deduction from adjusted gross income for gambling losses when computing the amount of income subject to the minimum tax
provision, would allow the full-time gambler a double deduction for purposes of
computing the minimum tax. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988 (White, J., dissenting).
The Court concluded that this "was certainly not Congress' intent." Id. (footnote
omitted).
160 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988-89 (White, J., dissenting).
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this, therefore, implied that Congress accepted the conclusion
that gambling is not a trade or business.' 6 '
Although gambling under the 1982 amendments is not a
trade or business, the dissent conceded that it could be argued
that gambling was a trade or business in 1978, the tax year in
question. 162 The dissent concluded, however, that under the
1982 amendments it was not the intention of Congress to alter
the trade or business status of gambling. 163 Instead, Justice
White noted that Congress only intended to rectify a perceived
gambling did not
inequity that had developed primarily because
64
business.1
or
trade
a
have the status of
The Supreme Court's decision in Groetzinger provides little
guidance for determining whether a particular activity is a trade
or business. By expressly adopting the Higgins "facts and circumstances" approach, the Court chose not to formulate a uniform
definition of the term "trade or business" that could be applied
in all contexts.' 65 The Court's choice, however, was made easier
by the enactment of the 1982 amendments, which eliminated the
specific statutory context in which the trade or business question
arose in Groetzinger.'66 The major impact of the Court's decision
was to settle a conflict among the various circuit courts regarding
the narrow issue of whether a full-time gambler is engaged in a
trade or business, for purposes of applying the minimum tax
provision.
161

16 7

Id.

162 Id. at 989 (White, J., dissenting).
163 Id.
164 Id. The perceived inequity referred to by the Court is the imposition of a
minimum tax in a'case like Groetzinger where the taxpayer has realized no economic
profit. See id. at 987-88 n.15. Under the 1978 minimum tax provision, "the more
[the full-time gambler loses] the more minimum tax he has to pay." Boyle, supra
note 1, at 754.
165 See Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988.
166 As a consequence of the 1982 amendments excluding gambling losses from
the minimum tax base, the specific trade or business issue decided in Groetzinger,
which was decided in the context of the minimum tax provision, could not arise
subsequent to 1982. See id. However, the Supreme Court's holding and the standard established to decide whether a trade or business exist will have a significant
impact on the determination of the elusive trade or business question in any one of
the numerous statutory contexts in which the issue may arise. See, e.g., Uhlfelder,
High Court's GroetzingerDecision CouldAffect Deductibility of Some Construction Expenses, 34
TAx NoTEs 856, 856 (1987); August & Levine, Goods and Services Test for Trade or
Business Reected by Supreme Court, 66J. TAx'N 298, 298-302 (1987); Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1215 n.175 (1987); Note, A
Holding Company's Stock in a Subsidiary: A Capital or Ordinary Asset?, 65 TEx. L. REV.
1029, 1050-53 (1987).
167 See Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 983, 988. See also August, supra note 166, at 302.
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The Court, although aware that the amorphous "facts and
circumstances" approach does not provide much help in solving
the trade or business issue, expressed some doubt as to whether
the Court or Congress should step in and provide one uniform
definition.' 6 In the Court's view, a universal definition would
provide little guidance and that one definition could not possibly
cover the variety of statutory contexts in which the term is employed.' 69 In any event, it is Congress that should supply the appropriate definition in each of the specific statutory contexts, and
not the courts.'

70

The dissent's contention that Congress impliedly recognized
that gambling did not constitute a trade or business by enacting
the 1982 amendments to the minimum tax provision, is of questionable validity. A closer reading of the applicable statutes
reveals that regardless of whether gambling losses are characterized as trade or business deductions, a double deduction will not
result. The statutory language specifically provides that if a gambling loss has already been deducted once as a trade or business
expense, it will not be allowed as a deduction a second time when
computing the minimum tax. 17 1 By its own internal operation,
168 See Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 The minimum tax provision in effect under the 1982 amendments, imposed a
minimum tax (called the "alternative minimum tax" in 1982) on "alternative minimum taxable income." See I.R.C. § 55(a), 55(b) (1982) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 55 (Supp. IV 1986)). "Alternative minimum taxable income" is defined as "the
adjusted gross income ... of the taxpayer for the taxable year" reduced by certain
specified items, including an amount designated as the "alternative tax itemized
deduction," and increased by the items of tax preference. I.R.C. §§ 55(b),
55(b)(1)(B) (current version at I.R.C. § 55 (Supp. IV 1986)). "Alternative tax itemized deductions" is further defined as an amount equal to the sum of certain
specified deductions, which include gambling losses (but only to the extent of gambling winnings). See I.R.C. § 55(e), 55(e)(A) (1982) (current version at I.R.C. § 55
(Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. § 165(d) (1982). These deductions which include gambling losses, are, however specifically excluded from the amount designated "alternative tax itemized deductions" if these deductions were already included in the
computation of adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 55(e) (1982) (current version at
I.R.C. § 55 (Supp. IV 1986)). The relevant sections of the 1982 minimum tax provision read:
§ 55. Alternative minimum tax for taxpayers other than corporations
(a) Tax imposed
In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, there is imposed
(in addition to any other tax imposed by this subtitle) a tax equal to the
excess (if any) of (1) an amount equal to 20 percent of so much of the alternative
minimum taxable income as exceeds the exemption amount, over
(2) the regular tax for the taxable year.

NOTES

1988]

789

the minimum tax provision prevents the very double deduction
that the dissent was concerned would result if gambling losses
were characterized as trade or business deductions. Because the
1982 minimum tax provision precluded such a double deduction,
it is illogical to reason that Congress was concerned with the
characterization of gambling losses as a trade or business
expense.
The Supreme Court, in Groetzinger, in addition to settling a
conflict that had developed among the circuit courts and the Tax
Court, finally established the "facts and circumstances" test as
the appropriate standard to apply in deciding the trade or business issue. 1 72 This is firmly advanced by the Court's express rejection of Justice Frankfurter's "goods or services" test. 173 In
establishing such a broad standard, the Court has succeeded in
shedding little light on the definition of a trade or business and
(b)

Alternative minimum taxable income
For purposes of this title, the term "alternative minimum taxable income" means the adjusted gross income (determined without regard to the
deduction allowed by section 172) of the taxpayer for the taxable year(1) reduced by the sum of (B)
(2)

the alternative tax itemized deduction plus

increased by the amount of items of tax preference.

(e)

Alternative tax itemized deductions
For purposes of this section(1) In general
The term "alternative tax itemized deductions" means an amount
equal to the sum of any amount allowable as a deduction for the taxable
year (other than a deduction allowable in computing adjusted gross income)
under(A) section 165(a) for losses described in subsection (c)(3) or
(d) of section 165.
§ 165.
(d)

Losses

Wagering Losses
Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed but only to the
extent of the gains from such transactions.
I.R.C. § 55(a), 55(b)(1)(b)-(b)(2), 55(e)(1)(A) (1982) (current version at I.R.C. § 55
(Supp. IV 1986)); I.R.C. § 165(d) (1982) (emphasis added). Therefore, under section 55(e) a second gambling loss deduction, for purposes of computing the minimum tax in 1982, would not be permitted if such gambling losses were
characterized as trade or business expenses deductible in computing adjusted gross
income. See id. § 55(e)(1)(A) (1982) (current version at I.R.C. § 55 (Supp. IV
1986)); I.R.C. § 62(1) (1982) (current version at I.R.C. § 62(1) (Supp. IV 1986)).
172 See Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 988.
173 See id. at 987.
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has chosen instead to leave the job of defining this term to Congress. 1 74 Therefore, until Congress or the Treasury decides to
provide a uniform definition, if indeed one exists, the Court must
continue to resolve the trade or business issue by analyzing all
the facts in each case to determine if the taxpayer's activity is sufficiently substantial and regular and entered into for the purposes of earning a living.
Michael F. Bodrato
174

See id. at 988.

